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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-4367 
_____________ 
 
SYBIL AHMAD, 
                           Appellant  
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY  
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of  Pennsylvania  
District Court  No. 4-11-cv-01342 
District Judge: The Honorable William J. Nealon 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 23, 2013) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
Sybil Ahmad appeals from the judgment of the United State District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the final decision of the 
Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability benefits 
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under Title II and supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the 
Social Security Act.
1
  We exercise plenary review over legal issues.  Chandler v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  Judicial review of the 
Commissioner‟s factual findings is limited to determining whether the findings are 
supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is “such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
Ahmad applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits in 
2008, alleging an onset of disability in April of 2008 due to persistent neck and 
lower back pain.  An MRI in January of 2008 revealed the presence of an Arnold-
Chiari malformation (ACM) of the brain and spinal cord.  Ahmad‟s ACM involved 
the “extension of the cerebellar tonsils below the level of the foramen magnum” by 
6.5 millimeters, with the extension measuring 8.3 millimeters in an MRI completed 
in November of 2008.  The latter MRI revealed no other intracranial abnormalities.  
Dr. Cantando, a neurosurgeon who examined Ahmad, documented that there was 
mild disc degeneration of the C5-6 and C6-7 discs, but no cord compression.  An 
MRI of the lumbar spine showed “[m]inimal degenerative changes of the discs at 
                                              
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 
1383(c)(3).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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L4-5 levels with slight encroachment,” and minimal disc bulging at L5-S1.  
Ahmad submitted the results of these diagnostic tests as well as the medical reports 
of Dr. Lombard, her treating physician; Dr. Paz, a pain specialist; and Dr. 
Cantando, a neurosurgeon.  In Ahmad‟s view, she was disabled because she was 
unable to work due to difficulties with walking, sitting, and using her arms to lift, 
pull or push.  She complained of difficulties with grasping, which affected her 
dominant right hand more than her left hand.  Headaches and pain also limited her 
ability to work. 
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing, during which 
Ahmad and a vocational expert testified.  Thereafter, in a written decision, the ALJ 
conducted the five step sequential analysis and concluded that Ahmad was not 
disabled.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.  The ALJ determined that Ahmad‟s 
degenerative joint disease and ACM were severe impairments, that these 
impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 of 
the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, App. 1, and that Ahmad was limited to 
certain sedentary work and unable to perform postural maneuvers.  In addition, the 
ALJ found that Ahmad had limitations in her ability to reach overhead and to use 
her dominant right upper extremity.  Based on the testimony of the vocational 
expert, the ALJ determined that there was other work in the national economy that 
Ahmad could perform.  Therefore, the ALJ concluded Ahmad was not disabled. 
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Ahmad‟s appeal to the District Court was unsuccessful.  This appeal 
followed.  She contends that the ALJ erred by discounting her subjective 
complaints and the opinions of her physicians.  In Ahmad‟s view, the medical 
evidence “clearly and unequivocally” showed that she was disabled for purposes of 
the Social Security Act. 
It is well settled that “[a]n ALJ must give serious consideration to a 
claimant‟s subjective complaints of pain” and “[w]here medical evidence does 
support a claimant‟s complaints of pain, the complaints should then be given „great 
weight.‟”   Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993).  Great weight 
also should be accorded a report from a treating physician, and an ALJ may not 
substitute her judgment on a medical question for that of a treating physician.  
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999).  An ALJ, however, “may 
afford a treating physician‟s opinion more or less weight depending upon the 
extent to which supporting explanations are provided.”  Id. (citing Newhouse v. 
Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir.1985)). 
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the ALJ carefully considered 
the evidence and accorded great weight to Ahmad‟s testimony and her physicians‟ 
reports by finding that she was limited to less than the full range of sedentary 
work.  Indeed, this finding was more limited than the opinion of the state agency 
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medical consultant who reviewed the medical evidence and opined that she was 
capable of performing light work with postural limitations.   
Ahmad asserts that her treating physicians opined that she was incapable of 
performing even sedentary work.  Scrutiny of these medical reports, however, fails 
to reveal any express opinion that she was unable to perform the sedentary work 
identified by the ALJ.  Instead, as the ALJ noted, the medical reports confirmed the 
presence of the ACM and mild degenerative disc disease and consistently 
documented numerous normal findings.  The ALJ appropriately considered this 
evidence in finding that Ahmad was limited to less than the full range of sedentary 
work.   
Finally, Ahmad contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Ahmad could 
“perform the requirements of representative occupations such as a surveillance 
system monitor,” for which there were “569 available jobs in the Pennsylvania 
State economy.”  In Ahmad‟s view, this position “does not exist in significant 
numbers to render it meaningful” for purposes of the final step in the sequential 
analysis.  This final step places upon the Commissioner the burden of showing that 
Ahmad is capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in 
the national economy.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) & (g), 404.1560(c), 
416.920(a)(4)(v) & (g), 416.960(c).   
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As support for this argument, Ahmad cites a single case in which the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the existence of 135 regional jobs as a surveillance system 
monitor was not a sufficient number of jobs to support a finding that the plaintiff 
could perform other work in the national economy.  Beltran v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 
1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing the determination that a plaintiff was not 
disabled because she was capable of performing a single position for which there 
were 135 regional jobs).  Beltran, however, is not controlling.  In light of our 
determination in Craigie v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1987), that 200 jobs in 
the regional economy was a “clear indication” that other meaningful work in the 
national economy existed, we conclude that the ALJ did not err by concluding that 
the 569 jobs available as a surveillance system monitor was evidence of other work 
in significant numbers in the national economy.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
